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Harvey Miller has a reputation as a leading bankruptcy lawyer, and he
deserves it. As his criticism shows, he understands why and how the Code
changed the Act in 1978 and how the drafters of Chapter 11 erred. Better
than all but a handful of other lawyers, Harvey Miller knows how to manipu-
late Chapter 11 to serve his clients' interests. He understands both the legal
and practical intricacies of Chapter 11. Were I the CEO of a large and troubled
company, I would hire Harvey Miller and gladly pay him twice what most
other bankruptcy lawyers would charge. In short, Harvey Miller is a Chapter
11 virtuoso.
And for those same reasons, Harvey Miller cannot be a true critic of Chap-
ter 11.
What is most notable about his article is its silence. Should Bradley and
Rosenzweig's proposal for the abolition of Chapter 11 be adopted?' He is still.
Should Michelle White's ideas about foreign systems of liquidation be adopted?'
His article is still. Should any of the other radical or near-radical proposals for
appointment of a trustee, auctions or the like be adopted?3 His article makes no
mention of those. Like any virtuoso, Harvey Miller is incapable of condemning
the institution that has allowed him to achieve virtuoso status. To ask him to
do so would be like asking Itzhak Perlman to burn his violin or Mozart to
destroy his best compositions. Replacing Chapter 11 with a provision for quick
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law. I thank Joseph M. Boyle, Michigan, Class
of 1996 for his help in preparing this Comment.
'See Michael H. Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE LJ.
1043 (1992).
-2See Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison, reprinted
in BANKRUPTCY: LEOA AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 467 (Bhandari ed., 1995) (a bankruptcy system which
favors liquidation over reorganization is more likely to be economically efficient).
'See Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations Reduced Costs, Improving Results,
73 B.U. L. REv. 581,621-35 (1993) (Adams proposed a two-pronged solution to reduce bankruptcy costs
in Chapter 11 reorganizations: 1) use a bifurcated trustee system where an independent third party would
be appointed to make fundamental bankruptcy decisions while the debtor could be retained to make busi-
ness activity decisions; and 2) provide guidance to the trustee in order to recommend liquidation or reor-
ganization); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 311, 319-23 (1993) (discussing partial solutions such as market theories and proposals for ex-ante
structuring); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case For Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127
(1986) (allow a court to auction the bankrupt and allow anyone to bid)..See also Douglas G. Baird, Revis-
iting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633 (1993).
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liquidation or sale would destroy the manifold possibilities that now exist for
interpreting and manipulating the intricate provisions found in Chapter 11. It
would minimize the possibilities for clever negotiation among the various par-
ties under Chapter 1 l's umbrella and would drive half of the members of the
National Bankruptcy Conference into retirement and the other half into the
litigation or workout departments of their law firms.
For these reasons, the Bankruptcy Review Commission dares not listen to
Harvey and his friends in deciding whether Chapter 11 needs substantial change.
The Commission must recall that Chapter 11 is not an end in itself; it is not
like a musical performance. Rather, it is part of the process by which the Ameri-
can economy cleanses itself of economic failure. It should therefore be measured
by the efficiency with which it accomplishes that end, not by its inherent beauty.
The power of a market economy is its ability to renew itself by driving the
inefficient out of business and fostering and enhancing the efficient. To the
extent this process is inhibited by Chapter 11 or by any other state or federal
law, a cost is imposed upon our society that must be borne in one way or
another by us all. Carried to its unthinkable extreme, the inability to do away
with inefficiency leads to the kind of dysfunction we have seen in the socialist
economies of Eastern Europe where businesses continued to produce products
that were inadequate, unwanted and unsalable on a free market. Chapter 11 can
hardly induce the kind of inefficiencies in our economy that socialism induced
in Eastern Europe, but its costs can be great and they should be considered by
the Bankruptcy Review Commission.
The costs of Chapter 11 have been the subject of a fulminating academic
debate that started shortly after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was
adopted.4 There have been a few apologists for Chapter 11 in that debate (includ-
4See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Modelfor Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 527,530 (1983) (suggesting that judicial valuations in Chapter 11 be guided by market valuations
obtained by selling ten percent of the firm on the open market, followed by a sale to prebankruptcy claim-
ants in accordance with prebankruptcy priorities); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANK-
RUPTcY LAW 209-24 (1986) (discussing potential changes to Chapter 11); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy
Case For Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 136-45 (1986); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New
Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 t-_ARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (claimants receive a set of rights or
options in the reorganized company); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bank-
ruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 717 (1991) (Chapter 11 is valuable as a forum for the expression of diverse
interests); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J.
1043 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE LJ. 437 (1992)
(reorganizational goals justify an inefficient system); Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World:
A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992) (the author proposed
something between market valuation and formal bankruptcy proceeding); James Bowers, Whither, What
Hits the Fan? Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26
GA. L. REV. 27 (1992) (Chapter 11 is unnecessary in view of state collection law); Douglas G. Baird,
Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & EcON. 633 (1993); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and
Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 595 (1993) (investors would incorporate preestablished restructuring
plans into their initial investment contracts); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, The Economic
Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 104-05 (1995).
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ing the Commission's Reporter, Professor Warren)5 but the weight of academic
opinion is against Chapter 11. Most argue that Chapter 11 is inefficient, costly
and wasteful. The most radical critics propose the abolition of Chapter 11.6
The other critics propose some form of sale, auction or speedy transfer of the
assets out of the hands of the existing managers and into the hands of "residual
holders" or others who have an interest in the debtor.7 Among other things,
these critics note that mostly Chapter 11 does not operate as a reorganization
procedure but as a procedure for slow liquidation. Only ten to fifteen percent
of all Chapter 1I's ever result in a confirmed plan of reorganization., The oth-
ers wind up in some sort of liquidation, either through Chapter 7 or through a
liquidating Chapter 11 plan.
The academic critics have been joined by various business critics who make
much the same argument but in different form.9 A leader of the parade of
'Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Casefor Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992); Donald R.
Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717(1991); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 79 (1992).
6Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HAv. L. REv. 775 (1988);
Michael H. Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter 11,101 YALE LJ. 1043 (1992).
7See Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 209-24 (1986); MarkJ. Roe, Bank
ruptcy and Debt:A New Modelfor Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. Rav. 527 (1983); Alan Schwartz,
Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & EdoN. 595 (1993); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A.
Skeel, The EconomicAnalysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BAKiL INST. L. REV. 85, 104-05 (1995);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51
(1992). See also supra note 3.
8Susan Jensen-Conklin, Financial Reporting by Chapter 11 Debtors: An Introduction to Statement of
Position 90-7, 66 AM. BANK. L.J. 1, 36-37 n.198 (1992) (finding that only ten to twelve percent of
Chapter 11 cases involve successful reorganizations); Honorable Stephen A. Stripp, Balancing of Interests
in Orders Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 562, 572 n.49
(1991) (only ten to fifteen percent of chapter 11 cases are successful."); ED FLYNN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
OF CHAPTER 1110-13 (1989) (a study of fifteen districts yielded a confirmation rate of seventeen percent,
including liquidating plans); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEv. J. 319,322
(1991); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 100 (1983) (A study of cases in the Western District of Missouri
during 1980 yielded a success rate of twenty-six percent. The study also found a significant relationship
between the size of the debtor and the likelihood of confirmation). Cf Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11, 41 n.105 (plans were confirmed for eighty-nine to ninety-six percent of
the seventy-four largest, publicly held companies that filed under Chapter 11 from 1979-86).
9Mary Graham, Bankrupt and Bullish, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1992, at 24; The Kindness of Chapter 11,
THE ECONOMIST, May 25,1991, at 83 (U.K. edition) (Chapter 11 is too kind to a troubled company's existing
managers and shareholders, and too harsh on creditors);John Greenwald, The Bankruptcy Game, TDAE, May
18, 1992, at 60 (all sorts of companies are taking refuge in Chapter 11 but too many use the law to stiffcreditors,
enrich lawyers and protect bad managers); Anna Cifelli, Management by Bankruptcy, TM, Oct. 31, 1983, at
69 (arguing that management uses the bankruptcy laws strategically, rather than as a source of relief); Paul
Richter, Corporations Learn to Tilt Bankrupcy in Their Favor;This Time, Continental Airlines Goes into
Chapter 11 with Plenty of Cash and Captive Passengers, L.A. Tms, Dec. 7,1990, at Al; Diana B. Henriques,
The Vulture Game, N.Y. TmiEs, July 19, 1992, § 6, at 18 (arguing that bankruptcy laws have fostered an
investment business); Lloyd Grove, On the Bright Side of Bankrupt; Lawyers, Accountants Find Boom in
Gloom, Tr WAsHomroN PosT, May 7,1991, at B1. See generally Steve H. Nickles & Edward S. Adams, Tracing
Proceeds to Attorneys" Pockets (and the Dilemma of Paying for Bankruptcy), 78 MINN. L. REv. 1079 (1994).
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horribles is Eastern Airlines. When Eastern Airlines filed its petition, it was
thought that the unsecured creditors would receive payment in full had it liqui-
dated at once. When the company liquidated twenty-two months later, the
unsecured creditors received a pittance.10 Certain postpetition suppliers, the
employees and managers of Eastern Airlines during the Chapter 11 proceed-
ings received money that they would not have received on prompt liquidation.
But not a single job was saved nor was a single long-term opportunity for
suppliers made available by this Chapter 11. Arguably, this long and slow death
was simply a means by which money that belonged to one set of creditors was
taken from them and diverted to others.
Wherever one stands on this academic debate-and there are many positions
and much disagreement-the debate should not be ignored by the Commission.
To reexamine Chapter 11 without considering proposals for reform in the aca-
demic literature would be like considering proposals for the reform of the
American aviation industry in 1950 by focusing exclusively on piston engines.
Like the most talented piston engine engineers, the Harvey Millers and Ken
Klees should be heard, but not to the exclusion of the jet propulsion advocates
like Adler, Aghion, Baird, Bradley, Rasmussen, Roe, Rosenzweig and others. If
the Bankruptcy Review Commission ignores the academic debate, its recommen-
dations and its judgment should be questioned. Whatever its predilections or
ultimate conclusion, the Commission must confront these serious challenges by
economists, lawyers, and businesspersons. It, far better than hurried members of
Congress, will be able to understand and possibly to implement some of the
critics' proposals. Less affected by the pressures of lobbyists pushing for par-
ticular narrow interests, the Commission has a leisure that is not available to
Congress. It would be regrettable if it did not use that opportunity.
I. THE COSTS OF CHAPTER 11
It is necessary first to identify the costs that are imposed upon society by
Chapter 11.1 In the academic literature, these costs carry many names and
they can be classified in many different ways. This Comment considers five
15What Constitutes Success in Chapter II? A Roundtable Discussion, 2 AM. BANIKR. INST. L. REV. 229,
235-37 (1994) (Was Eastern Airlines a Success?"); Michael H. Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Time to
Scuttle Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, § 3, at 13. David Epstein reports that, contrary to other
reports, the unsecured creditors had received a ten percent dividend and that the dividend might eventu-
ally reach fifteen percent by the end of 1995.
"See Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORGPAN. 523 (1992);
Steve H. Nickles & Edward S. Adams, Tracing Proceeds to Attorneys' Pockets (and the Dilemma of Paying
for Bankruptcy), 78 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1994). See also Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy
Decision, 3 J. EcoN. PERSP. 129, 147 (1989) (estimating that indirect costs (deadweight costs) exceed direct
cost by eleven times); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 753 n.267 (1993) (providing
examples of indirect costs). See infra note 21.
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separate costs, though some of them are interrelated.
A. TREATMENT OF MANAGERS IN CHAPTER 11
Managers of firms who might be driven into bankruptcy by financial distress
are probably not indifferent to what will happen to them if their firms go into
bankruptcy. One reason Congress and the Bankruptcy Commission of the 1970's
allowed existing management to continue operation as debtors-in-possession
and otherwise made Chapter 11 comparatively painless for the managers was
to avoid one of the costs of a more harsh system. 12 This is the cost that arises
when a failing firm liquidates piecemeal or takes other actions to avoid bank-
ruptcy even though bankruptcy reorganization would be the most sensible
course. Put another way, leniency encourages early resort to bankruptcy, before
the firm has become so deeply insolvent that it cannot be saved.
On the other hand, some have suggested that managers of failing companies
should be punished in bankruptcy-that the treatment should be severe, not
lenient. 3 These critics of Chapter 11 suggest that managers will work harder,
produce more and be more efficient managers of the firm if financial distress
brings harsh consequences to them.
Even though the Congress in 1978 and some of the critics since then assume
that the reception that awaits the managers in bankruptcy will influence their
behavior, the two groups seem to come to opposite conclusions about the proper
reception and about the incentives that should be offered-fear of bankruptcy
or affinity to it.
In any event, some of the critics of Chapter 11 maintain that managers are
not sufficiently punished, that the "punishment effect" is too low and thus that
managers do not work as hard as they otherwise might to avoid financial distress.
Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig argue that managers may even embrace Chap-
ter 11 for strategic purposes that are contrary to the interests of others.
Among all existing bankruptcy regimes, Chapter 11 is perhaps the least
12H.R REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6191
(Proposed Chapter 11 recognizes the need for the debtor to remain in control to some degree, or else
debtors will avoid the reorganization provisions in the bill until it would be too late for them to be an
effective remedy.7).
"See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORGAN. 523
(1992) (arguing that punishment costs are minimized in a system that treats managers harshly, for example,
quick liquidation or appointment of trustees. Conversely, the punishment effect is higher in a system that
treats managers leniently); The Kindness of Chapter 11, THE ECONOMIST, May 25, 1991, at 83 (U.K.
edition) (Chapter 11 is too kind to a troubled company's existing managers and shareholders, and too harsh
on creditors). See also Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Compari
son, reprinted in BANKR uPTcY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 479-83 (Bhandari ed., 1995) (ex ante
cost of bankruptcy and the costs associated with the punishment effect).
4Michael H. Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.
1043, 1069 (1992); Anna Cifelli, Management by Bankruptcy, TIME, Oct. 31, 1983, at 69 (arguing that
management uses the bankruptcy laws strategically, rather than as a source of relieo.
1995)
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punishing.'5 Because Chapter 11 turns existing management into the debtor-
in-possession, there is minimal punishment. This is true despite the fact, as
demonstrated by Professors Whitford and LoPucki, that by the end of most
large Chapter 1 i's the principal managers lose their jobs.' 6 At least in the United
States system many managers appear to keep their jobs throughout a Chapter
11 and those who eventually lose their jobs keep them for a year or possibly two
years longer than they would under many other systems. Thus, the punish-
ment imposed by Chapter 11 is less severe than the punishment that would be
imposed by most foreign systems or by any system that automatically ousts
management in favor of a trustee or that provides for swift sale or liquidation.
Of course, the hypothesis of the punishment effect-namely that those
who face the prospect of punishment will work harder to keep from suffering
and will thus cause their firms to be more successful than would otherwise be
true-is itself subject to challenge. The company may go into bankruptcy for
reasons beyond the control of the managers; even companies whose managers
work long and hard may go into bankruptcy notwithstanding those efforts.
Moreover, many managers may already be stimulated to work at their maxi-
mum potential by the incentives for success without regard to the punishment
that will occur because of failure.
In short, the "punishment effect" is interesting but unconfirmed by empirical
data. I believe that Congress erred in 1978 by minimizing punishment, but it is
hard to make a persuasive empirical case for the efficacy of maximizing punish-
ment.
B. OVER AND UNDERINVESTMENT
It is now cliche to note that an agent may make investments that disfavor
shareholders and creditors if the agent's interests are not exactly aligned with
the interests of shareholders and creditors. 7 This divergence of interests may
cause the managers of a distressed firm to invest in projects that are too risky,
and fail to invest in more conservative projects that will benefit the creditors
but not the managers.
Assume a company in financial distress that is insolvent but has not filed
for bankruptcy relief. Assume that the managers are major shareholders and
"See Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison, reprinted
in, BANKRUPTCY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 470 (Bhandari ed., 1995).
"
6Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669,723 (1993) (in ninety-one percent of the forty-
three public companies studied, there was a least one change in CEOs).
'7Professors LoPucki and Whitford note that the allegiance of managers of large public companies may
shift with the solvency of the company. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Gover-
nance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 751
(1993) (Management's orientation was clearly a function of the company's solvency. The management of




that they, together with the other shareholders, will reap the benefits from an
investment only to the extent of the increase of the firm's net worth above zero
and not to the extent of an increase that reaches only to zero. If assets are 500 and
liabilities are 1,000, the first 500 of profits will go to creditors; shareholders
will profit from investments only after the assets stand at 1,000 and so equal
the liabilities. In those circumstances, the managers, concerned only with their
own interests and not with the interests of creditors, might decline to invest in
projects where the positive projected value could be expected to raise the firm
only to solvency but not above. On the contrary, their selfish interests might
cause them to invest in quite risky transactions whose aggregate projected value
is negative but which promise a large profit in a minority of circumstances.
Assume that an investment of 500 could be expected to produce a return
of only 100 in eight out often cases but a return of 1500 in two out often. This
would be a losing proposition, for the expected return-summing all ten possi-
bilities and dividing by ten-from the investment of 500 would be only 380.
On the other hand, if the managers were to take everything above a return of
1000, yet no part of the first 1000, it might be in their interest to make such an
investment. The managers and shareholders reap a large part of the upside, but
the creditors suffer the entire downside. This problem, of course, exists in and
out of bankruptcy; it is minimized by aligning the managers' interests with the
interests of others who have an interest in the firm.
While the theory about over and underinvestment by managers of distressed
firms is plausible, there is no empirical evidence that confirms the theory with
respect to financially distressed firms. Until confirmed, it is difficult to see how
the theory can be the basis for amendments of the existing bankruptcy law.
C. DELAY
I believe that the largest and most palpable costs of Chapter 11 arise from
delay. These costs arise in' and outside19 of bankruptcy anytime a firm that is
inefficient continues to operate and experience losses. By hypothesis these losses
"5See Honorable Steven IV. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 Bank{-
ruptcy Cases, 67 Am. BNKP. L.J. 287 (1993) (significant legal issues are left open in Chapter 11; signifi-
cant decisions left to the discretion of the judge; necessity of two appeals to produce binding precedent;
some provisions are awkward and complex; some factual issues may be relitigated in the same case; no
effective rules for case management; requirement for disclosure statements cannot be justified; procedures
for requesting relief are unnecessarily complex); H. Miles Cohn, Protecting Secured Creditors Against the
Costs of Delay in Bankruptcy: Timbers of Inwood Forest and its Aftermath, 6 BAs'u.R. DEv. J. 147 (1989).
'9See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439,443 (1992) ('commen-
tators underestimate total costs when they myopically attribute to reallocation positive insolvency incen-
tives, while failing to recognize that reallocation creates perverse incentives that precede, and can cause,
financial distress"); Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. ECON. PERSP., 129, 147
(1989) (estimating that indirect costs (deadweight costs) exceed direct cost by eleven times); Robert K.
Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 Am. BAxNR.
INsT. L. REV. 85, 99 (1995) (the authors point out that stay waivers may impose delay costs and other
expenses on other creditors without providing any significant offsetting benefits).
1995)
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are waste. Society would be better served by causing the compary to invest in
other and more efficient activities. Chapter 11 -at least as practiced in large
cases-appears to condone and even exaggerate delay and the attendant costs.
For example, Eastern Airlines lost $600 million during the twenty-two months
it lingered in Chapter 11.20 LTV continued in bankruptcy from July, 1986, to
May, 1993, and during most of that time incurred losses. Countless other smaller
and nameless Chapter 11's-as many as ninety percent-have this attribute;
namely, they are businesses that must ultimately be liquidated, but it takes as
long as eighteen months on average to accomplish liquidation.2' And during
every one of those 550 days in bankruptcy, many, perhaps most, of these firms
are experiencing losses and postponing the day when their assets can be allo-
cated to better and more efficient purposes. The costs of delay are palpable and
indisputable. The Commission should address them.
D. DIRECT COSTS
The most easily measurable costs of bankruptcy are the so-called direct costs,
the costs of lawyers, accountants, investment bankers and the like and the costs
that are necessarily associated with the operation of the business under court
supervision. 22 Because these costs are so obvious, they are most frequently men-
tioned in the press and most commonly cited by creditors. Surely they are impor-
tant, but it is unclear exactly how one avoids them if one is to have a reorganization
proceeding. Of course, to the extent that they are folded into the cost of delay
discussed above, they should be minimized. If a reorganization that should take
two months takes two years, the delay has magnified the direct costs of bank-
2 Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEv.J. 319 (1991).
"Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J.
FIN. EcoN. 285, 298 (1990) (average length of the bankruptcy process for a sample of New York and
American Stock Exchange firms that filed for bankruptcy is around two-and-one-half years); Karen Torrey,
Ch. 11 Alternative Often a Better Bet for Small Biz., CRAIxNS'S CHI. Bus., Aug. 29, 1988, at 12 (debtors with
less than $50 million in revenues average one year and six months in a bankruptcy reorganization); Julian
R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747,
748 (1989) (large reorganizations average almost four years in length). See infra note 25.
12Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. FIN. 477, 484 (1983)
(finding direct costs of large reorganization cases average six percent of disbursements to all creditors);
Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J. FIN. EcoN.
285, 289 (1990) (finding direct costs in large reorganizations to be 20.6 percent of market value of equity,
3.1 percent of book value of debt plus market value of equity, and 2.8 percent of book value of total assets);
Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067,
1075-77 (1984) (finding direct costs of large reorganization cases to average six percent of total value);
Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1992) (discussing empirical
studies that have addressed the various costs of bankruptcy); Robert Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Profes-
sional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small Finn Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 847 (1994) (a study of
fifty-seven small firm bankruptcies filed in Memphis found that professional fees accounted for twenty
percent of distributions. These figures were "vastly" greater than those found in previous studies of direct
costs of large firms); Claudia MacLachlan, Anger Rises Over Bankruptcy Fees, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 9 1992, at
1;Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11: A Review of the Evi-
dence, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 131, 134 n.10 (1993) (discussing a number of empirical studies).
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ruptcy by ten times or more. Therefore, one way to attack the direct costs of
bankruptcy is to treat them as a cost of delay and to work to reduce that delay.
E. SELECTION ERROR
If one assumes that certain firms-namely the inefficient and distressed-
should be liquidated while others-namely the efficient but distressed-should
be reorganized, one must pay the cost of determining whether a particular firm is
a sheep or a goat and a further and wasteful cost if the process does not correctly
identify those who should be liquidated as goats and those who should be saved
as sheep. These are Professor Michelle White's "type I" and "type IF errors that
keep alive the inefficient (type I) but kill the efficient (type II).23 It is the implicit
hypothesis of her writing, and one that I share, that Chipter 11's generosity
encourages error on the side of reorganization. 4 One datum that arguably supports
that proposition is the fact that as many as ninety percent of all firms that file for
"reorganization" in Chapter 11 ultimately liquidate. Their lingering death in
Chapter 11 takes on average as long as eighteen months." This is really no more
than a feature of the cost of delay described above and it seems that it should be
treated as such. That is to say, there are inevitable costs associated with distin-
guishing between firms that should be liquidated and those that should be saved.
Those costs should be minimized. To the extent they are not minimized and to
the extent incentives are granted to managers to exaggerate them, there is waste.
There does not appear to be any system in Europe or elsewhere that is less
likely than Chapter 11 to commit the error of liquidation of a company that
should be reorganized.26 I, therefore, urge the Commission to ignore type II
23See Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganization and
Out.of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. EcoN. & ORGAN. 268 (1994).
24See Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison, reprinted in
BANRupTcy: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 470 (Bhandari ed., 1995) (as will be seen, the approach in
the United States is to encourage early bankruptcy filing by treating managers more leniently in bankruptcy.").
See also Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORGAN. 523 (1992);
Michael H. Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter 11,101 YALE LJ. 1043 (1992).
25See George G. Triantis, The Interplay of Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of
Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, working paper on file with author, at 7 n.19; Edward I. Altman,
Evaluating the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.Reorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 2-4, 22-23
(1993); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 729,732-39 (1993). See also
ED FLYNN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 11 23-28 (1989) (concluding that the average time from
filing to confirmation is 740 days and the median time is 656 days). See supra note 21.
:*Foreign jurisdictions tend to screen potential bankrupt-debtors at the outset to determine if reorganiza-
tion is a worthwhile cause. For example, French insolvency laws appoint an administrator during an initial
observation period to determine if the debtor should be reorganized or liquidated. Barthelemy Mercadal,
France, 26 IT't LAw. 531 (1992). The Canadian insolvency laws also screen potential debtors early in the
reorganization process and allow creditors and the courts to evaluate the debtors proposed plan. D. J. Kee
& Elizabeth A. Scott, Canada, 27 INT'L LAw. 215 (1993). This screening process is more likely to deny a
debtor bankruptcy protection for the purpose of reorganization and is more likely to terminate reorganiza-
tion proceedings at an earlier stage than the system in the United States. In either case, the Canadian
system favors liquidation over reorganization in questionable cases. George G. Triantis, The Interplay of
Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, working
paper on file with author, at 21.
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errors and concentrate on the delay associated with type I errors-trying to
save the unsavable.
II. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN CHAPTER 11
What can and should the Bankruptcy Review Commission learn from these
costs and what can and should the Commission do? The Commission should
focus on the costs of delay and on the related direct costs of bankruptcy. As
noted above, reducing delay once a debtor is in bankruptcy may itself have a
greater impact on the direct costs than anything else that can be done.
The simple-minded way to attack delay and the direct costs of bankruptcy
is to do what Congress did to a limited extent in 1994; namely, to attempt to
limit the exclusivity period by shortening the 120 days in § 1121(b) and by
restricting the judges' power to extend that period.27 While limits of that sort
may be desirable, much more subtle tools are necessary to defeat the likes of
Harvey Miller when it is in the interest of Harvey's client to slow down a
Chapter 11. What could be done? Consider some possibilities.
A. PAY TRUE COSTS
First, the Commission should consider the reversal of United Savings Asso-
ciation v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.2" Recall that in Timbers,
the Supreme Court held that protection was "adequate" even though it did not
protect the secured creditor's lost opportunities. Section 361 could require
that the debtor not only accrue but actually pay an amount equal to a fair
return on the value of the secured creditor's collateral. Thus, if the creditor had
a $1 million loan secured by a $1 million asset and ten percent were the appro-
priate rate of return, the debtor would be obliged to pay $8,300 each month to
the secured creditor. Payments of that sort might discipline not only the debtor,
but also the unsecured creditors, and the counsel of both. Moreover, it would
end a subsidy now given by the secured creditors to the unsecured creditors
and others during the pendency of a Chapter 11 proceeding.
B. CUT OFF FUNDING
Second, the Commission might gradually diminish the level of payment,
even to zero, to lawyers, accountants and investment bankers.29 Thus, one might
2711 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(1), (2), (3) (1994). Where the debtor decides to be treated as a small business,
the exclusivity period is 100 days. This period may be extended only on a showing of circumstances
beyond the debtor's control. Id. § 1121(e)(3)(B).
28484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988) (concluding that undersecured creditors are not entitled to interest on the
value of their collateral to assure adequate protection under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1994)).
2911 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(A), 507(a)(1), 1129(a)(9) (1994). Any change to the treatment of administra-
tive expenses may modify behavior of the participants in strategic and unintended ways; for example, fees
might be front-loaded to avoid restrictions on fees later. The law could also give bonuses for speedy pro-
ceedings.
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provide that a judge who is setting fees should normally make no payments for
services rendered more than six months after the petition is filed and should
scale down the payments for services made more than ninety days after the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. If such limitations were properly applied,
they would reverse the current incentives of the Chapter 11 agents. The self-
ish interest of lawyers, accountants and investment bankers now favors delay;
how much more wonderful if their incentives favored a hasty conclusion.0
C. INITIATE EARLY ASSESSMENT BY A NEUTRAL
Third, one might adopt a variant of the French 31 or Canadian 32 system.
"Debtors might even be encouraged to solicit competitive bids from potential agents. See, e.g., In re
Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (the court relied upon a competitive bidding process to
select class counsel in securities litigation), reconsideration denied, 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
3'French law is designed to provide failing firms assistance before the need for bankruptcy arises. This
"preventive maintenance" involves the use of business experts who monitor the financial statements of
member firms and offer help at the first sign of trouble. Debtors may also seek court help when it is apparent
that the debtor will be in need of funds. In such cases, the court may appoint a conciliator who will assist
the company in workouts with its creditors. If these measures fail, any party may file for the debtor's
bankruptcy (technically only when the debtor cannot pay its debts).
In 1986, the French bankruptcy laws where reformed to save failing firms and maintain employment.
Satisfaction of the creditors' claims is no longer the primary priority of bankruptcy, although it is still a
significant consideration. Creditors are protected in other ways, such as the ability to pursue corporate
management for the debts of the corporation.
Bankruptcy begins with a screening process where the debtor's financial statements are reviewed to
determine if a plan should be proposed or whether liquidation should be commenced. This period of re-
view has been shortened with the 1986 reforms in order to reduce costs and to simplify the procedure (no
more than eighteen months). An Administrator may be appointed at the outset of bankruptcy to supervise
the process and propose a plan, or the debtor may retain these functions. Employee committees are given
a greater role in rehabilitation proceedings. After the screening process, the court will determine if a
proposed plan should be adopted or liquidation of the company would be best. DENmis CA 1PBELL, INTER-
NATIONAL CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 178-205 (Butterworths 1992).
"The Canadian legislature enacted a new federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Act") in 1992
because prior insolvency laws were not binding upon secured creditors. The Act provides the debtor a
'waiting period" from all claims, including those of secured creditors.
A debtor can initiate a reorganization by filing a notice of intention to make a proposal or by filing the
actual proposal it wishes to make to its creditors. However, the timetable under which the debtor must
act is more demanding than the United States counterpart. If the debtor files a notice of intention, it has
thirty days to file the proposal. The time period'may be extended for additional periods of up to forty-five
days, but the debtor is limited to a total of five months in extensions. A creditor may oppose an extension on
various grounds, including that the creditor's agreement to a proposal will not happen within the time limits,
or at all. Within ten days after filing a notice of intention to make a proposal, the debtor must file a projected
cash flow with its own report and a report from the trustee on the reasonableness of the projected cash flow.
These reports will assist creditors and the court in assessing the viability of the proposed reorganization.
The Act also provides guidelines for creditors to follow in evaluating a proposal. Further, the Act
does not allow parties to alter or terminate an agreement with the debtor, or to claim an accelerated
payment simply because the debtor has filed a petition. The new Act, however, does not prevent a sup-
plier from requiring payments on a C.O.D. basis, nor does it require that anyone make further advances of
money or credit to the debtor after the filing. D.J. Kee & Elizabeth A. Scott, Canada, 27 INT'L LAW. 215
(1993); George G. Triantis, The Interplay of Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of
Screens, Gateeepers, and Guillotines, working paper on file with author. See supra note 26.
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Under the French reorganization system, an official is appointed to determine
whether the firm can and should be reorganized or whether it should be liqui-
dated. Chapter 11 might be amended to provide either that the United States
trustee or an appointed trustee make a finding not more than 120 days after
the petition whether the debtor should be liquidated or reorganized. Upon the
former conclusion, the debtor would be put into Chapter 7. If one could find
trustees capable and tough enough to make this decision, and if adequate stan-
dards could be established concerning which firms should be reorganized and
which should be liquidated, these rules might have a substantial impact on the
time the debtor spends in bankruptcy.
D. APPOINT A TRUSTEE
Fourth, one might replace the debtor-in-possession with a trustee if no
plan has been confirmed within six months after the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.33 This would stimulate both the debtor-in-possession and the debtor-
in-possession's agents (who might be replaced if a trustee were appointed) to
prepare and present a plan of reorganization.
E. REDUCE INCENTIVES
Fifth, the Commission should consider the incentives buried in and associ-
ated with the administrative rules such as those found in §§ 361, 363 and 364
and make Chapter 11 less inviting to those who should not be there. If, for
example, creditors who lend to debtors in Chapter 11 were not automatically
elevated under §§ 364(a) and 503(b)(1) to administrative expense status, and if
others could not so readily attain even higher status under the other subsec-
tions of § 364, creditors themselves would have to distinguish between the
sheep and the goats.3
4
If the Commission is persuaded that too many linger in Chapter 11 before
they suffer the inevitable liquidation, it seems that the solution to that problem
does not lie in harsher timetables under § 1121 but, rather, in the manipulation
of the administrative powers such as §§ 361, 362 and 364 in ways that directly
affect the incentives of Chapter 11 agents, suppliers, postpetition lenders and
others. Doubtless there are more subtle incentives that I have not thought of,
but in general the Commission should work on the incentives of the Chapter
11 participants. It should not attempt to solve delay simply by timetables that
can be waived.
3 See Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs. Improving Re-
suts, 73 B.U. L. REv. 581, 621 (1993) (proposing a bifurcated trustee to avoid a conflict of interest). But
see Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Pro-
ducer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (1995).
34Some agents now fare particularly well. See, e.g., Callister v. Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. (In re Callister),
673 F.2d 305, 306 (10th Cir. 1982) (attorney's fee paid before other superpriority claims). But see In re Tri-




My proposals and those of all the Chapter 11 critics reject the subtext found
in Chapter 11 by many courts,3 namely that one should err on the side of
reorganization as opposed to liquidation and spare no expense in the search for
a way to reorganize. The revised statute should rectify that mistake; it should
encourage not just liquidation or sale, but quick liquidation or sale. Few Chapter
1 l's ever produce a successful reorganization plan;36 that datum should spawn
skepticism not optimism about the prospects for reorganization in Chapter 11.
Congress should tell the courts that they have served just as well-or better-
when there is a quick liquidation or sale as when there is a reorganization.
G. CONSIDER RADICAL PROPOSALS
Finally, the Commission should consider at least some part of the compara-
tively radical proposals that have been made in the academic debate during the
last ten years. Most of these proposals have not been worked out in careful
detail; many of them would require amendment to dozens of sebtions in Chapter
11. To authorize the form of buyout contemplated by Adler,37 successions con-
templated by Bradley and Rosenzweig,1 or sales of slices of equity of the kind
suggested by Roe39 would require complicated and detailed drafting. New sec-
tions would have to be integrated with existing law. These new sections would
interact with existing law in ways that cannot readily be anticipated. It may
be beyond reason to believe that the Commission in two years' time could fully
35See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs. Ltd.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1408 (5th Cir. 1986) ("In many Chapter 11 cases ... the likely result of
orders requiring periodic postpetition interest payments to undersecured creditors will be the immediate
conversion to Chapter 7-a result which seems inconsistent with the congressional policy favoring at-
tempts at reorganization."); Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall
Partnership), 2 F.3d 899, 914 (9th Cir. 1993) (in determining that the new value exception survived the
Code's enactment, the Ninth Circuit observed that "the new Chapter 11 shifted bargaining power away
from creditors and in favor of debtors. Consequently, it made plan confirmation easier.... [W] e believe
that the structural changes to the reorganization process made by the Code are in harmony with the pro-
confirmation principle underlying the new value exception.7), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681, motion to vacate
denied & dismissed as moot, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994); Rochman v. Northeast Utilities Serv. Group (In re
Public Serv. Co.), 963 F.2d 469,471-72 (1st Cir.) (recognizing the public policy favoring orderly reorgani-
zations and settlement of the debtors estate in bankruptcy proceedings), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992);
In re Ford Business Forms, Inc. v. Sure Card, Inc., 180 B.R 294,299 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (Whereas the
aim of a Chapter 7 liquidation is the prompt closure and distribution of the debtor's estate, Chapter 11
provides for reorganization with the aim of rehabilitating the debtor and avoiding forfeitures by credi-
tors7); In re AV.B.I., Inc., 143 B.R. 738, 739 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992) ("Chapter 11 is designed to foster
consensual plans of reorganization.").
"6See supra note 8.
"See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STrN. L.
Rzv. 311 (1993).
3sSee Michael H. Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE LJ.
1043 (1992).
"See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 527 (1983).
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incorporate any of those in a detailed way. Nevertheless, small parts of these
radical suggestions might be picked out and enacted. The suggestions made
above-appointing a trustee or authorizing the United States Trustee or the
court to order a liquidation or sale of a company on relatively short notice-is
not beyond the power of the Commission.
CONCLUSION
Let us hope that the Bankruptcy Review Commission does not condemn
the next generation to drone through the weather at 10,000 feet and 200 knots
when that generation could be cruising high above in the clear at 450 knots.
